Judicial Review in Louisiana: A Bicentennial Exegesis by Baier, Paul R. & Chadwick, Georgia D.
Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 5
Number 1 200 Years of Statehood, 300 Years of Civil
Law: New Perspectives on Louisiana's Multilingual
Legal Experience
Article 3
10-1-2012
Judicial Review in Louisiana: A Bicentennial
Exegesis
Paul R. Baier
Louisiana State University Law Center, paul.baier@law.lsu.edu
Georgia D. Chadwick
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Paul R. Baier and Georgia D. Chadwick, Judicial Review in Louisiana: A Bicentennial Exegesis, 5 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2012)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol5/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            JOHN MARSHALL 
                               FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN 
Photo by David Rigamer 
Courtesy of Curator’s Office 
Louisiana Supreme Court Museum 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN LOUISIANA: A BICENTENNIAL 
EXEGESIS 
 
By Paul R. Baier∗ and Georgia Chadwick** 
 
This court, and every court in this state, not only possesses 
the right, but is duty bound, to declare void every act of the 
legislature which is contrary to the constitution. The due 
exercise of this power is of the utmost importance to the 
people, and if it did not exist their rights would be shadows, 
their laws delusions, and their liberty a dream. 
—François-Xavier Martin  
I. PRÉFACE: 1812-2012 
 No scholar of Louisiana’s public law that we can find has 
trumpeted a “general provision” of Louisiana’s Constitution of 
1812 that has since disappeared. This was a long time ago. 
Louisiana joined the United States of America on April 30, 1812, 
exactly nine years after the Louisiana Purchase of 1803—the year 
of Marbury v. Madison. Jefferson doubted the constitutionality of 
the purchase; John Marshall later sustained it. John Marshall was 
Chief Justice of the United States in 1812. War with Britain raged. 
General Andrew Jackson triumphed in the Battle of New Orleans. 
But the Constitution triumphed over the General. This was the last 
skirmish of the War of 1812, another Bicentenary to celebrate—or 
to lament—depending on one’s view of the facts and the law. Here 
is an early chapter, the earliest we can find, in the annals of judicial 
review in Louisiana.  
                                                                                                             
 ∗ George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center, Louisiana State University. Secretary, Supreme Court of Louisiana 
Historical Society.  
 ** Law Librarian of Louisiana. Executive Director, Supreme Court of 
Louisiana Historical Society. Curator, Supreme Court of Louisiana Museum, 
400 Royal Street, New Orleans, open to the public. The Museum’s exhibit cases 
walk you through two hundred years of the Court’s history, in photographs, 
portraiture, and memorabilia, from its earliest days in the Cabildo, built under 
Spanish rule, ca. 1795, to the beaux arts magnificence of the Supreme Court’s 
1910 building, now restored to its original glory in the heart of the Vieux Carré. 
For a tour, call Georgia Chadwick, 504.310.2402.  
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 We mean judicial control by way of the Great Writ of 
Habeas Corpus of the Executive Branch, of the Commander in 
Chief—the judicial root, if you will, of Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008), of late, the Supreme Court’s condemnation of 
Section 7 of the Military Commission Act of 2006 as an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 
violation of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States 
Constitution: “The Clause protects the rights of the detained by a 
means consistent with the essential design of the Constitution. It 
ensures that, except during periods of formal suspension, the 
Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the 
‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard 
of liberty.”—per Kennedy, J.—Chief Justice Roberts, joined by 
Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, dissenting. 
Another 5-4, split decision. Binding on the President? 
II. LE TEXTE 
 ARTICLE VI. SECT. 25. By way of a Bicentennial 
exegesis we propose assaying the last general provision of Article 
VI of Louisiana’s Constitution of 1812, the lost provision of 
Louisiana’s fundamental law that caught our eye. It is the last of 
twenty-five “Dispositions Générales,” to quote the French version. 
It appears almost as an afterthought.  
 Here is the text of Section 25, precisely as it appears in the 
English version of ARTICLE VI. General Provisions, 
CONSTITUTION OR FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE 
OF LOUISIANA, adopted January 22, 1812, quoted in its elegant 
simplicity, center-stage, so to speak, echoing down through 
contemporary legislative, executive, and judicial chambers:  
“All laws contrary to this Constitution shall be null and void.” 
Or, to quote the French version:  
“Les lois contraires à cette Constitution seront nulles.” 
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III. THE LOST PROVISION 
 Section 25 disappeared from Louisiana’s public law with 
the adoption of the Constitution of 1845. It has never appeared in 
any Louisiana Constitution thereafter. Why? We suppose that after 
a generation on the books, by the time of the Louisiana’s 
Constitution of 1845, it was generally accepted that Louisiana’s 
fundamental law, voiced by the Judiciary, controls the Legislative 
and the Executive Magistracies. François-Xavier Martin in his 
painstaking HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 
(Vol. I, 1827; Vol. II, 1829) blithely passes over Section 25 in his 
detailed description of the provisions of Louisiana’s first 
Constitution. More recently, Tulane Law School Dean Emeritus 
Cecil Morgan in his little jewel of a book, THE FIRST 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA (1975), for the 
Historic New Orleans Collection, draws the reader’s attention to 
“some interesting aspects” of Louisiana’s first Constitution that 
“deserve special mention.” He says nothing at all, however, about 
Section 25. To us, it jumps off the page. It reminds us of John 
Marshall’s immortal principle, “supposed to be essential to all 
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is 
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by 
that instrument.” The italics, nota bene, are John Marshall’s. 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 180 (1803).  
 After two hundred years we propose a Bicentennial Minute 
entry essaying the origin of judicial review in Louisiana. We throw 
Bicentenary light on what is a vital, yet completely overlooked, 
now lost, provision of Louisiana’s first “CONSTITUTION OU 
FORME DE GOUVERNEMENT DE L’ETAT DE LA 
LOUISIANE.” 
IV. FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, GEORGE WYTHE 
 Doubtless there was talk of Montesquieu’s Espirit des Lois 
in Vieux Carré coffee houses in the founding days of Louisiana’s 
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public law. François Martin, a jurist of indefatigable scholarship, 
undoubtedly nursed himself on Montesquieu and John Marshall. 
He hardly slept for all the books he read. He spent his nights 
preparing his astounding ORLEANS TERM REPORTS (1809-1812) 
and his LOUISIANA TERM REPORTS (1813-1830), to say nothing of 
his night watches reading law tirelessly, reading law endlessly. We 
can easily imagine François Martin reading George Wythe’s 
monumental opinion in Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5 (1782), 
by candlelight in his Vieux Carré lodgings. We are sure he read it. 
Here is Chancellor Wythe’s renowned passage announcing judicial 
condemnation of a legislative act, 4 Call 8: 
I shall not hesitate, sitting in this place, to say, to the 
general court, Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum; and, to the usurping 
branch of the legislature, you attempt worse than a vain 
thing; for, although, you cannot succeed, you set an 
example, which may convulse society to its centre. Nay 
more, if the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated, 
should attempt to overstep the bounds, prescribed to them 
by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the 
country, will meet the united powers at my seat in this 
tribunal; and, pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, 
here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go, 
but no further. 
 Call in his report of the case advises: “N.B. It is said, that 
this was the first case in the United States, where the question 
relative to the nullity of an unconstitutional law was ever discussed 
before a judicial tribunal; and the firmness of the judges 
(particularly of Mr.Wythe,) was highly honourable to them; and 
will always be applauded, as having fixed a precedent, whereon, a 
general practice, which the people of this country think essential to 
their rights and liberty, has been established.” 4 Call 21. 
 Wythe’s biography is entitled, GEORGE WYTHE: TEACHER 
OF LIBERTY (Alonzo Dill, 1979) (“In observance of the 200th 
anniversary of the beginning of the teaching of law at the College 
of William and Mary, 1779-1979.”) Chancellor Wythe also taught 
constitutional law at the College of William and Mary. For a brief 
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period of time one of his students at William and Mary was none 
other than—guess who?—John Marshall.  
 What was John Marshall doing in 1812?—the year of 
Louisiana’s sovereignty? We will answer this question later in our 
Bicentennial Minute Entry. 
V. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, ESPIRIT DES LOIS 
 Professor Jean Brissaud, late professor of legal history in 
the University of Toulouse, in his heroic book, A HISTORY OF 
FRENCH PUBLIC LAW (1904) (IX Continental Legal History Series; 
translated by James W. Garner) (1915), tells us of Montesquieu’s 
theory of separation of powers: “The spirit of independence of our 
old Parliaments, their opposition to the crown, and the example 
(which is questionable) of England counted for much in the 
formation of this theory.” But French Public Law severed the 
Judiciary’s head with La Révolution Française. “The judges could 
not meddle in the exercise of legislative power, either by means of 
orders taking jurisdiction, or by preventing or suspending the 
execution of laws; nor could they pass upon the constitutionality of 
laws.” Brissaud, § 502. The Principle of Separation of Powers. 
 Assuredly to the delight of Justice Antonin Scalia, 
Montesquieu insists that the judiciary should restrict itself to 
applying the laws to particular cases in a fixed and consistent 
manner, so that “the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, . . . 
becomes, as it were, invisible” ESPIRIT DES LOIS, 1748, 11.6; THE 
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Thomas Nugent trans., New York, Hafner 
Library of Classics, 1949, p.156.  
 Ironically, Justice Scalia is hardly invisible on this side of 
the Atlantic. Judicial review in Louisiana, to be sure, is not one of 
our French inheritances.  
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VI. IL EMPEROR NAPOLEON, GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON 
 The Civil Law celebrates legislation, “c’est mon Code 
civil,” says Napoleon. True enough. But whence judicial review in 
Louisiana? What enables a Common Law judge to hold General 
Andrew Jackson in contempt? Judge Dominick Hall so held. This 
was the fiery judicial climax of the War of 1812. Hall was the 
United States District Court judge sitting in New Orleans. Jackson 
ordered Hall arrested for issuing a writ of habeas corpus 
challenging the General’s declaration of martial law and his arrest 
of one Louis Louallier, a native of France, a naturalized citizen of 
the United States, and a member of Louisiana’s House of 
Representatives. Louallier crossed Jackson’s sword by publishing a 
letter to the editor of the Courier de la Louisiane. The letter 
excoriated Jackson’s exile of Frenchmen from New Orleans. “MR. 
EDITOR:—To remain silent on the last general orders, directing all 
the Frenchmen, who now reside in New Orleans, to leave it within 
three days, and to keep at a distance of 120 miles from it, would be 
an act of cowardice, which ought not to be expected from a citizen 
of a free country; and when everyone laments such an abuse of 
authority, the press ought to denounce it to the people.”  
 Louallier extolls “the firmness of the magistrates, who are 
the organs of the laws in this part of the union, and the guardians 
of public order.”  
 He concludes by saying, “[I]t is high time the laws should 
resume their empire.” “[I]t is time the citizens accused of any 
crime should be rendered to their natural judges, and cease to be 
dealt with before special or military tribunals, a kind of institution 
held in abhorrence even in absolute governments . . . .” Alcée 
Fortier, A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA (1904), Vol. III, p. 155.  
VII. JUDGE F.-X. MARTIN 
 François-Xavier Martin, one of the “natural judges” to 
whom Louallier addressed himself, says of General Jackson’s 
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explosive reaction to Louallier’s letter: “Man bears nothing with 
more impatience, than the exposure of his errors, and the contempt 
of his authority.” You can find this universal truth reported in 
Martin’s HISTORY OF LOUISIANA, Vol. II (1829), p. 392; Pelican 
Publishing Co. Reprint 1975, p. 393.  
 General Jackson ordered Louallier tried as a spy by court 
martial. It mattered not that Louallier was a naturalized citizen of 
the United States and a civilian member of the Louisiana 
Legislature. It made no difference that Louallier sided loyally with 
Jackson against the British, who had fled New Orleans. Louallier’s 
letter to the editor was seditious.  
 Death was the penalty under Jackson’s declaration of 
martial law. Jackson considered New Orleans his military camp. 
Inter arma silent leges, as Cicero says. The General was above the 
law. He was beyond judicial control, according to the 
Jurisprudence of the Camp. 
VIII. JUDGE DOMINICK A. HALL 
 Not so at all. United States District Court Judge Dominick 
Hall had the last word—for the moment at least—duly reported in 
United States v. Major General Andrew Jackson, No. 791, United 
States District Court, District of Louisiana (1815). Jackson’s arrest 
of Hall was held a contempt of court, an unlawful military act 
against “the firmness of the magistrates.” The General was fined a 
thousand dollars. Later, after his two terms as President of the 
United States, the United States Congress at the urging of 
President John Tyler passed legislation reimbursing Jackson in full 
for the thousand dollar fine he paid, plus interest amounting to 
$2,700.  
 Here, then, is the earliest chapter in the life of judicial 
review in Louisiana, recently revisited as a highlight of the 
Bicentennial of the United States District Court, Eastern District of  
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Louisiana, New Orleans, on line at http://www.laed.uscourts.gov 
/200th/main.php.  
IX. SOURCES OF SECTION 25 
 1. ALEXANDER HAMILTON. Alexander Hamilton’s 
Federalist Paper No.78 is a pretty good place to start. We quote 
the relevant passage: 
The complete independence of the courts of justice is 
peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited 
constitution I understand one which contains certain 
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such for 
instance is that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post 
facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be 
preserved in practice no other way than through the 
medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to 
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the 
constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of 
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. 
 
 This from the original edition of THE FEDERALIST: A 
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN FAVOR OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTION, AS AGREED UPON BY THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
SEPTEMBER 17, 1787, VOL. II. NEW-YORK: PRINTED AND SOLD BY 
J. AND A. M‘LEAN, NO. 41, HANOVER-SQUARE, MDCCLXXXVIII, p. 
292-293. 
 Hamilton’s No. 78 differs slightly, but significantly, from 
Section 25. Only laws contrary to “the manifest tenor” of the 
constitution are void.  
 This allows more flexibility in the joints of legislation and 
keeps the judges at a deferring distance. James Bradley Thayer of 
Harvard Law School dubbed this qualification on the scope of 
judicial review, “The Rule of Clear Mistake.” James Bradley 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893). Today this 
rule finds its voice most clearly in, say, Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), or Chief 
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Justice Roberts’s dissent in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008).  
 2. KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION OF 1799. Next, it is 
generally said that the Kentucky Constitution of 1799 is the origin 
of Section 25. True enough, but our exegesis would emphasize a 
difference in text that warrants notice. ARTICLE X of Kentucky’s 
Constitution of 1799 is essentially a bill of rights that, through 
some twenty-seven sections, recites the fundamental rights of 
citizens, including the “natural and indefeasible right to worship 
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences” 
and proclaims “[t]he free communication of thoughts and opinions 
is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely 
speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the 
abuse of that liberty.” Note the latter limitation of free speech: 
“being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” The Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798 come to mind. Justice Samuel Chase’s stiff 
enforcement of the Sedition Act against James Callender, a friend 
of Thomas Jefferson in Republican Virginia, is well known.  
 Callender published a book entitled, THE PROSPECT BEFORE 
US, in which he called President John Adams a “repulsive pedant, 
a gross hypocrite and an unprincipled oppressor.” Chase presided 
at Callender’s trial; the defense attempted to argue the 
unconstitutionality of the law.  
 But Chase, a loyal federalist judge on the Supreme Court, 
thought the law pristine, pure, and certainly constitutional. On the 
other hand, Thomas Jefferson thought the Sedition Act pernicious, 
impure, and patently unconstitutional. As President of the United 
States Jefferson pardoned Callender on the ground that, in 
President Jefferson’s view, the Sedition Act violated the First 
Amendment. The President would follow his own legal judgment. 
Never mind Justice Samuel Chase’s opinion. Here is an early 
instance of inter-branch conflict over constitutional interpretation. 
We shall recur to this matter in a moment.  
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 3. ARTICLE X. SEC. 28. ARTICLE X of the Kentucky 
Constitution of 1799 concludes in its last section as follows: 
Sec. 28. To guard against transgressions of the high powers 
which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this 
article is excepted out of the general powers of government, 
and shall forever remain inviolate; and that all laws 
contrary thereto, or contrary to this constitution, shall be 
void. 
 This section’s text emphasizes the fundamental rights of the 
citizen; all laws contrary thereto shall be void. Judicial review, just 
as Hamilton justified it in No. 78, is aimed at protecting the 
expressed fundamental rights of the citizen. 
 4. THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JAMES MADISON 
(March 15, 1789). Thomas Jefferson is on record to the same 
effect. Writing to James Madison about the proposed Bill of 
Rights, he opined: 
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you 
omit one which has great weight with me; the legal check 
which it puts in the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, 
which, if rendered independent and kept strictly to their 
own department, merits great confidence for their learning 
and integrity.  
 James Madison’s support of the Judiciary as a guardian of 
the proposed Bill of Rights is well known (1 Annals of Congress 
457 (1789)): 
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent 
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar 
manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an 
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in 
the Legislature or Executive; they will be naturally led to 
resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated 
for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.  
 
 5. MARBURY v. MADISON. Every first-year law student 
can recite Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury v. 
Madison in favor of the Judiciary adjudging the constitutionality of 
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legislation. “Certainly all those who have framed written 
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and 
paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every 
such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant 
to the constitution, is void.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 
177 (1803). But who declares the repugnancy? Says the Great 
Chief Justice: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”  
 Of course, Jefferson insisted that the Judiciary keep strictly 
to its own department. He thought John Marshall wandered too 
loosely into Executive territory in Marbury v. Madison.  
 Jefferson always believed that each branch of government 
should decide for itself the constitutionality of laws affecting it. In 
other words, to him Judicial Supremacy was an anathema.  
  6. MONTESQUIEU. Ironically, judicial review in the 
American Republic traces itself back ultimately to the Framers’ 
insistence on separation of powers, a morphed version of the Baron 
de Montesquieu’s political theory. Recall Montesquieu considered 
the judicial power “so terrible to mankind.” He had in mind the 
French Parliaments of the Ancien Régime.  
 After the French Revolution the Parliaments were 
dissolved. The judges were rendered eunuchs. “Of the three 
powers above mentioned, the judiciary,” said Montesquieu, is 
“next to nothing.” Not so here. George Wythe, John Marshall, 
François Xavier-Martin—all gave voice to the Judiciary as 
Guardian of the Ark of the Constitution. In other words, in 
America the Judiciary is Montesquieu’s watchdog—over 
Separation of Powers, as well as the Bill of Rights. Judicial 
Review is born of both.  
 The doctrine of “division of powers,” as Montesquieu 
formulated it, appears as the first Article of Kentucky’s 
Constitution of 1799. Thomas Jefferson was its source, transmitted 
by James Madison to John Brown to assist in the formation of the 
Kentucky Constitution. THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Julian 
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P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press, 1952, Vol. 6, p. 283. In turn, it 
appears as Article I of Louisiana’s Constitution of 1812; they are 
duplicates. Here is Louisiana’s:  
ARTICLE 1st. 
 
Concerning the distribution of the Powers of Government. 
 
SECT. 1st. The powers of the government of the State of 
Louisiana shall be divided into three distinct departments, 
and each of them be confided to a separate body of 
Magistracy viz—those which are Legislative to one, those 
which are executive to another, and those which are 
judiciary to another.  
 
SECT. 2d. No person or Collection of persons, being one of 
those departments, shall exercise any power properly 
belonging to either of the others; except in the instances 
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. 
 George Wythe justified judicial review in the name of 
separation of powers. He held an act of the Virginia House of 
Delegates, a pardon, unconstitutional where Virginia’s 
Constitution required the concurrence of the Senate, which was not 
forthcoming. Commonwealth v. Caton is the taproot of judicial 
review in the American Republic, as we have unearthed it.  
 John Marshall himself while a member of Virginia’s 
Executive Council was asked to remove a Justice of the Peace for 
gross misdemeanors disgraceful to his office. In an opinion signed 
by the future Chief Justice of the United States, dated February 20, 
1783—twenty years before Marbury v. Madison—the Executive 
declared that “the Law authorizing the Executive to enquire into 
the Conduct of a Magistrate . . . is repugnant to the Act of 
Government, contrary to the fundamental principles of our 
constitution, and directly opposite to the general tenors of our 
Laws.” PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, p. 280.  
 So too, judicial review in Louisiana finds root in the first 
article of the Constitution of 1812, “Concerning the distribution of 
the Powers of Government.” 
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X. ON READING LAW 
 What would Justice Antonin Scalia say of ARTICLE VI, 
SECT. 25? He would insist on reading its text according to its 
original meaning. We had better repeat the text: “All laws contrary 
to this Constitution shall be null and void.” What this means to us 
is that all laws contrary to this Constitution are null and void. But 
this is an exegesis of judicial review in Louisiana, not a review of 
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s new book, READING LAW, THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (Thompson/West 2012).  
XI. SECTION 25’S TEXT 
 The text of Section 25 says nothing at all about which 
organ of government, or perhaps all of them, has the constitutional 
authority to decree a conflict between statute and Constitution. The 
text says nothing at all about this. For the answer, we must look 
elsewhere. Perhaps to history. Perhaps to THE FEDERALIST, 
favorite reading of Justice Scalia. Perhaps “Es liegt in der Natur 
der Sache,” as the Germans say. Or, to repeat Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s exclamation in Marbury: “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).  
 Justice Scalia subscribes to judicial review, to be sure, but 
not the freewheeling nonsense of the Living Constitutionalist 
Society. We commend READING LAW to our readers.  
XII. THE NOTION OF A “LIVING CONSTITUTION” 
 Justice Scalia condemns the notion of a “Living 
Constitution.” That is to say, a “living organism,” one that must 
evolve with society or else “become brittle and snap.” Reading 
Law, p. 410. So speak its advocates. Scalia’s response? “Sed truffa 
est!” “But this is nonsense!” To the contrary (id., 407-408):  
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[I]f the Living Constitution advocates are correct, if the 
American Constitution should mean whatever each 
successive generation of Americans thinks it ought to 
mean, then Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided. The 
Members of Congress take the same oath to support the 
Constitution that the Justices do. Marbury v. Madison’s 
holding that the Supreme Court can disregard Congress’s 
determination of what the Constitution requires is firmly 
rooted in the reasoning that the Constitution is a law, whose 
meaning, like that of other laws, can be discerned by law-
trained judges.  
 But what of law-trained Presidents? What of a Harvard 
Law School President who thinks the Affordable Health Care Act 
constitutional? The Constitution says nothing at all about why 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s legal opinion should trump President 
Barack Obama’s. The Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional 
according to President Obama. He instructed his Attorney General 
not to defend its constitutionality in court. The Congress of the 
United States, however, passed the Act. Members of Congress, a 
majority for sure, presumably judged DOMA constitutional 
pursuant to their oath to support the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court has yet to voice its opinion on the question.  
XIII. A BLANK SPACE 
 Our point here is that the text of Section 25, however clear, 
gets us nowhere. It is a blank space in our Bicentennial inquiry. To 
be sure, we bow humbly to Justice Scalia’s “2. Supremacy-of-
Text Principle”:—“The words of a governing text are of 
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is 
what the text means.” READING LAW, p. 56.  
 But ironically, the very power that makes Justice Scalia’s 
opinion trump that of the President, assuming he has four votes for 
his OPINION OF THE COURT, is nowhere to be found in what the text 
of Section 25 means. Judicial supremacy comes to life only later, 
after John Marshall, after Marbury v. Madison.  
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  It is clear to us at least, if not to Justice Scalia, that “The 
judicial Power of the United States,” as Article III of the United 
States Constitution declares it, has evolved over time—in fact and 
in law. 
 Thomas Jefferson in response to Chief Justice Marshall’s 
subpoena duces tecum in the Burr trial invoked the prerogatives of 
the Presidency, an early claim of Executive Privilege. He withheld 
certain documents in the interest of national security. Abraham 
Lincoln defied Chief Justice Taney’s writ. Richard Nixon 
disgraced the Presidency, but he stiffly yielded to Chief Justice 
Burger’s judicial rejection of his claim of Executive Privilege, a 
claim that “he and he alone” is the proper one to interpret the 
Constitution regarding the scope of Executive Privilege. The 
quotation is from Leon Jaworski’s oral argument.  
 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), if not Cooper 
v. Aaron before it, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), surely settles the question of 
which of Montesquieu’s three branches tops the tree. 
XIV. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL 
 For our Bicentennial salute to Section 25, we should rather 
invoke the immortal words of The Great Chief Justice, John 
Marshall: “In considering this question, then, we must never 
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.” McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). (Justice Scalia quotes this 
line in READING LAW, but he mistakenly fails to italicize the “a” in 
John Marshall’s “it is a constitution we are expounding” (p. 405). 
Pardonez nous, Mr. Justice.  
XV. IL GIUDICE SAPIENTE  
 We consider Justice Scalia Il Giudice Sapiente—from the 
Latin “sapere,” to have taste or flavor; wise; full of knowledge; 
discerning; often ironical—surely a fit description of the first 
Roman on the Court. Paul R. Baier, The Supreme Court, Justinian, 
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and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 La. L. Rev. 
489, 502 (2007).  
 Justinian himself would admire Justice Scalia. Il Giudice 
Justinianus, another of our terms of endearment for Scalia, J., 
quotes Justinian’s Digest in his book READING LAW (p. 56): A 
verbis legis non est recedendum (“Do not depart from the words of 
the law”).  
 Justice Scalia considers the evolutionists’—the 
contemporary constitutional Darwinists’—reliance on Chief 
Justice Marshall’s grand dictum, “it is a constitution we are 
expounding” to be absolute nonsense, at worse an absurdity, at best 
a canard. “But far from suggesting that the Constitution evolves, its 
whole point was just the opposite.” READING LAW, p. 405.  
XVI. EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  
 Quite to the contrary, our researches convince us that 
Section 25’s vital significance, its Bicentennial meaning after two 
hundred years, is not to be found in its text—after all it has 
disappeared—but in the evolution of judicial review in the 
American Republic. Section 25 shows that Justice Scalia’s horse is 
dead. It has been withdrawn from il Palio di Siena.  
 Mea culpa, Il Giudice Justinianus. But let us move on to 
other Bicentennial data.  
XVII. TREATY OF CESSION, ENABLING ACT 
 Article III of the Treaty of Cession between the United 
States of America and the French Republic of April 30, 1803 (8 
Stat. 200) contains a promise that the inhabitants of the ceded 
territory shall be incorporated in the union of the United States, 
and admitted as soon as possible, “according to the principles of 
the federal constitution”; the Enabling Act of Congress of February 
20, 1811 (2 Stat. 641), authorizes a constitutional convention for 
the purpose of framing a government and incorporating the citizens 
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of the Territory of Orleans into a sovereign state. It requires the 
convention to declare, “in behalf of the people of the said territory, 
that it adopts the constitution of the United States” and provides 
further that the constitution to be formed: 
shall be republican, and consistent with the constitution of 
the United States; that it shall contain the fundamental 
principles of civil and religious liberty; that it shall secure 
to the citizens the trial by jury in all criminal cases, and the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, conformable to the 
principles of the constitution of the United States . . .  
 We see in the Treaty of Cession and the Enabling Act the 
inchoate right of judicial review, assuring to the people of 
Louisiana as their birthright the fundamental principles of 
separation of powers and of individual rights. Marbury v. Madison 
announced these vital features of the public law of the United 
States of America on February 24, 1803, a couple of months before 
the Treaty of Cession and the Enabling Act. To our minds, Article 
III and the Enabling Act adopt by reference John Marshall’s 
reasoning in Marbury v. Madison: “[A]n act of the legislature, 
repugnant to the constitution is void.”  
 Certainly our research and exegesis suggest that the 
principle of judicial review implicit in Marbury, and perhaps John 
Marshall’s opinion itself, may very well have been on the minds of 
the Framers of Article VI, Section 25 of Louisiana’s Constitution 
of 1812.  
XVIII. LOUISIANA’S MARBURY V. MADISON 
 Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Martin (N.S) 1 (1828), is Louisiana’s 
Marbury v. Madison. François-Xavier Martin—assuredly, 
Louisiana’s John Marshall—delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The case is this. The Mayor and City Council of New Orleans 
refused obedience to a writ of mandamus issued by a court of first 
instance commanding the Mayor et al. to seat a person on the 
Council whose election was drawn in question. An act of the 
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Legislature declared that the City Council “shall be the judge” of 
the election of its members. Judge Martin reasoned that if the 
Legislature had the power to grant to the municipal corporation of 
New Orleans the right to determine the validity of the elections of 
its members, the district court was without jurisdiction to issue the 
writ of mandamus. Held: The Legislature had the power to render 
the City Council the “judge of the validity of their elections, and 
prohibit courts of justice from interfering with its decisions”; the 
provision of the Acts of 1816 in question was constitutional. Thus 
the writ of mandamus was void. Morgan, the Sheriff, who seized 
the revenues of the City in execution of the judicial orders, was a 
trespasser liable in damages.  
 We commend Judge Martin’s full opinion to the reader as 
an exemplar of Martin’s judicial statesmanship and the power of 
his judicial poetics. 
 There is plainly an echo of John Marshall in Judge Martin’s 
opinion in Mayor v. Morgan, 7 Martin (N.S.), at 7: 
This court, and every court in this state, not only possesses 
the right, but is duty bound, to declare void every act of the 
legislature which is contrary to the constitution. The due 
exercise of this power is of the utmost importance to the 
people, and if it did not exist their rights would be shadows, 
their laws delusions, and their liberty a dream; but it should 
be exercised with the utmost caution, and when great and 
serious doubt exists, this tribunal should give to the people 
the example of obedience to the will of the legislature. 
XIX. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL, 1812 
 What was Chief Justice Marshall doing in 1812? We 
promised to answer to this question earlier on. The case we have in 
mind is State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (1812). It is 
not mentioned in any contemporary constitutional law casebook. 
We dug it up ourselves by leafing through the pages of 7 Cranch, 
February Term 1812. This is what legal historians call original 
research.  
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 Our digging shows the Great Chief Justice adjudging a 
constitutional claim arising under a Treaty of Cession between 
certain Delaware Indians and what was then the Province of New 
Jersey, under a conveyance of land from King Charles 2d, to the 
Duke of York. These Delaware Indians had claims to a 
considerable portion of lands in New Jersey. The Act of Cession, 
August, 1758, relinquished the Indians’ claims on condition that 
the government purchase a tract of land on which they might reside 
in perpetuity. The Act stipulated that the land to be purchased for 
the Indians “shall not hereafter be subject to any tax, any law usage 
of custom to the contrary, in any wise notwithstanding.”  
 Later on, in 1801, the Delaware of New Jersey wanted to 
migrate from the State to join their brethren in Stockbridge, New 
York. The New Jersey Delaware obtained an act of the New Jersey 
Legislature authorizing the sale of their land. “This act contains no 
expression in any manner respecting the privilege of exemption of 
taxation which was annexed to those lands by the act, under which 
they were purchased and settled on by the Indians,” recites Chief 
Justice Marshall in his opinion of the Court. Thereafter in 1803, 
the year of Treaty of Cession between the United States and the 
Republic of France, and, coincidently, the year of Marbury v. 
Madison, the land in question was sold.  
 Next, as you might imagine, the New Jersey Legislature 
repealed the act of 1758, which had exempted the land from 
taxation. Held: The Repealing Act “is repugnant to the constitution 
of the United States, in as much as it impairs the obligation of a 
contract, and is, on that account, void.” And more—per Marshall, 
C. J. (7 Cranch 167): 
The privilege [of exemption from taxation] though for the 
benefit of the Indians, is annexed, by the terms which 
create it, to the land itself, not to their persons. It is for their 
advantage that it should be annexed to the land, because, in 
the event of a sale, on which alone the question could 
become material, the value would be enhanced by it. 
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 In short, in 1812, the year of Louisiana’s sovereignty, Chief 
Justice Marshall was enforcing the Constitution of the United 
States, viz.: “The Constitution of the United States declares that no 
state shall “pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts.” Article VI, Section 20 of the 
Louisiana Constitution of 1812 says almost the same thing: “No ex 
post facto law nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts 
shall be passed.” And, then, we know, there is Article VI, Section 
25. We quote its pristine text one last time: “All laws contrary to 
this Constitution shall be null and void.” 
 Chief Justice Marshall, if we may say so, is an honored 
guest at our Bicentennial table.  
XX. A BICENTENNIAL MINUTE ENTRY 
 We come full circle, back to the future, back to CASES 
ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF LOUISIANA, EASTERN DISTRICT. FEBRUARY 
TERM, 1815, 3 Martin (1813-1815).    
 We mean the clash between the General and the Judge 
previously rehearsed. This time, however, we draw the legal 
historian’s attention to the Minute Book of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. It plainly shows that it was Louisiana’s Judge François 
Martin, not United States District Court Judge Dominick Hall, who 
first trumpeted the authority of judicial review in the annals of 
Louisiana’s public law.  
 Here are the facts, a matter of reported chronology.  
 At the opening of the February Term, Eastern District, 
1815, a commission was read by which François-Xavier Martin, 
then Attorney General of the State, was appointed a Judge of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, together with a certificate 
of his having taken the oaths required by the Constitution and law, 
whereupon he took his seat. “The din of war prevented any 
business being done, during this term.” 3 Martin V 3 [529].  
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 A month later, at the opening of the March Term 1815, 
before the Honorable Pierre Derbigny and the Honorable F.-X. 
Martin, the Minute Book shows: 
On motion of Mr. Duncan of counsel for the appellees it is 
ordered that the appellant—to show cause on Monday next 
the 13th instant—why the parties should not proceed in this 
case notwithstanding the act passed by the Legislature on 
the 18th december last, entitled “An Act . . .  
 We quote the minute entry of March 7, 1815. The case is 
James Johnson v. Duncan et al.’s Syndics, reported in 3 Martin 
530.  
 On the same page of the Minute Book, appears the minute 
entry of Monday 13th March 1815: 
The parties aforesaid having appeared by their attorneys in 
conformity with a rule taken in this case on the 7th instant 
& the arguments thereon being closed the Court took time 
to decide. 
 Next, our Bicentennial Minute entry appears on the same 
leaf of the Minute Book, this for Monday, March 20th, 1815: 
The Court now delivered their opinion in writing on the 
motion made in this cause on the 7th instant and ordered 
that the same be overruled. 
 What is this case about? 
 Martin, J., explains the case in his report, 3 Martin 530. 
Remember, the din of war raged. Here is the terse opening of 
Judge Martin’s opinion of the Court: 
Martin, J. A motion that the Court might proceed in this 
case, has been resisted on two grounds: 
 
1. That the city and its environs were by general orders of 
the officer, commanding the military district, put on the 
15th of December last, under strict Martial Law. 
 
 2d. That by the 3d sec. of an act of assembly, approved on 
the 18th of December last, all proceedings in any civil case 
are suspended. 
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 Judge Martin first addresses the argument of General 
Jackson. Listen to the voice of Louisiana’s Judge François-Xavier 
Martin—Bicentennial fireworks on the levee (3 Martin, 532-533): 
We are told that the commander of the military district is 
the person who is to suspend the writ, and is to do so, 
whenever in his judgment the public safety appears to 
require it: that, as he may thus paralyze the arm of the 
justice of his country in the most important case, the 
protection of personal liberty of the citizen, it follows that, 
as he who can do the more can do the less, he can also 
suspend all other functions of the civil magistrate, which he 
does by his proclamation of Martial Law. 
 
   THIS mode of reasoning varies toto celo from the decision 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of 
Swartout [sic] and Bollman, arrested in this city in 1806 by 
general Wilkinson. The Court there declared, that the 
Constitution had exclusively vested in Congress the right of 
suspending the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, and 
that body was the sole judge of the necessity that called for 
the suspension. “If, at any time,” said the Chief Justice, 
“the public safety shall require the suspension of the 
powers vested in the Courts of the United States by this act, 
(the Habeas Corpus act,) it is for the Legislature to say so. 
This question depends on political considerations, on which 
the Legislature is to decide. Till the Legislature will be 
expressed, this Court can only see its duties, and must obey 
the law.” 4 Cranch 101. 
 Swartwout and Bollman, you might surmise, is the voice of 
John Marshall.  
 Thus, John Marshall is brought home to our Bicentennial 
table as a surprise guest. The Great Chief Justice is here courtesy 
of Louisiana’s Great Jurist François Martin. It is a nice touch to 
our way of seeing things that John Marshall and F.-X. Martin’s 
marble busts face each other, today, after two hundred years, 
guarding the portal to the Louisiana Supreme Court Chamber, 
fourth floor, 400 Royal Street, in the heart of the Vieux Carré—
open to the public.  
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 Of course Judge Martin sustained the act of the Louisiana 
Legislature suspending all judicial proceedings during the War of 
1812, against the claim that the act impairs the obligation of 
contracts (3 Martin, 542, et seq.)  
It does not, however, necessarily follow that an act called 
for by other circumstances, than the apparent necessity of 
relieving debtors, one of the consequences of which is 
nevertheless to work some delay in the prosecution of suits, 
and, consequently to retard the recovery and payment of 
debts, must always be declared unconstitutional. 
 One thinks of our contemporary Louisiana Legislature 
likewise suspending prescription after Hurricane Katrina. Nothing 
unconstitutional about that. 
 Now notice, please, that Judge Martin first takes up Major 
General Jackson’s claim that his declaration of Martial Law trumps 
the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus. Why do that? The Legislature 
has constitutionally suspended judicial proceedings. Why address 
the General’s claim? The answer lies in what scholars call “judicial 
statesmanship.” Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison comes to mind. He addressed jurisdiction last. So too, 
Martin.  
 Here is the closing part of Judge Martin’s rejection of 
Major General Jackson’s claim (3 Martin 537): “How preposterous 
then the idea that a military commander may, by his own authority, 
destroy the tribunal established by law as the asylum of those 
oppressed by military despotism!”  
   
 We reach the end of our Bicentennial sojourn, a final 
minute entry. 
 The Minute Book of the Louisiana Supreme Court shows 
that Judge Martin rendered on Monday, March 20, 1815.  
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 On the other hand—take note ye legal historians—the 
contempt proceedings against Major General Andrew Jackson, No. 
791, commenced the next day, March 21, 1815. John Dick, the 
United States Attorney, was anxious to initiate contempt 
proceedings against General Jackson; “but Hall insisted on a few 
days being exclusively given to the manifestation of the joyous 
feelings, which termination of the war excited. He did not yield to 
Dick’s wishes till the 21st.” François Xavier Martin, HISTORY OF 
LOUISIANA, Vol. II (1829), p. 416; Pelican Publishing Co. Reprint 
1975, p. 405. Amazingly, our Bicentennial Minute Entry shows 
that Judge Martin appears first in the Chronology of Judicial 
Review in Louisiana.  
 Judge Martin himself, in his LOUISIANA TERM REPORTS, 
appends a note (3 Martin 557) to his report of Johnson v. Duncan 
et al.’s Syndics. We leave the last word to Reporter F.-X. Martin—
his enduring gift to the American Republic: “THE doctrine 
established, in the first part of the opinion of the Court, in the 
above case, is corroborated by the decision of the District Court of 
the United States for the Louisiana District, in the case of United 
States vs. Jackson, in which the defendant, having acted in 
opposition to it, was fined $1000.” (Our Bicentennial emphasis—
corroborated.)  
 Requiescat in pace, F.-X. Martin.  
 
